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It has been described as an "upheaval" of established law. It will
open up a "Pandora's box" and "turn the tables" on previous legal
understandings. 2 It "eviscerates" long-standing legal doctrine.3 What
sort of revolutionary event could invoke such grim language? Surely,
"It" must be a headline case involving a high-profile social issue like
the constitutionality of same-sex marriage, 4 corporate contributions to
political campaigns, 5 or restrictions on First Amendment rights.
Instead, "It" is the First Circuit's opinion in United States v. Textron
Inc.,6 a case involving an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summons for
tax accrual workpapers and Textron's attempts to protect the docu-
mentation under the work-product doctrine. The First Circuit
reversed the Federal District Court of Rhode Island and set aside a
First Circuit panel's holding the workpapers as privileged, instead
holding that, because the workpapers were prepared "to support
financial filings and gain auditor approval,"7 and not for use in litiga-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2011; M.S.
in Accountancy, 2007; B.B.A. 2006, University of Notre Dame. I would like to thank
Professor Matthew Barrett for his advice and discussion during the preparation of this
Note.
1 David E. Frank, Attorneys Predicting 'Upheaval' in Wake of Work-Product Ruling,
MAss. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 24, 2009, at 1.
2 Id.
3 Amir Efrati, Ruling in Tax-Auditing Case Puts Corporations on Edge, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 20, 2009, at A9, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1250723970557445
33.html.
4 See, e.g., Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
5 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
6 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009).
7 Id. at 31.
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tion, the IRS could freely discover the tax accrual workpapers. The
corporate world immediately criticized the controversial ruling, as
critics rushed to assert that the ruling makes it more difficult to pro-
tect their clients in an increasingly opaque tax system.8
Why such strong criticism? First, corporate tax departments and
IRS auditors have engaged in a tug-of-war over the IRS's ability to
access a corporation's tax accrual workpapers, which are generally
prepared both to support tax calculations published in its financial
statements and its tax return and to gain insight into certain transac-
tions whose tax effects may not have found their way onto the corpora-
tion's tax return. Textron, by rejecting the argument that tax accrual
workpapers are prepared "in anticipation of [future] litigation" with
the IRS, serves as the latest blow to the corporate world's hopes of
work product protection. In addition, the First Circuit's conclusions
in Textron have ramifications beyond the current financial reporting
regime; as early as 2014, U.S. companies may be required to imple-
ment new international standards for income tax accounting, particu-
larly when accounting for uncertain tax positions. This Note attempts
to lay the foundation for how (if at all) these new international stan-
dards, in conjunction with the Textron decision and recent IRS
Announcement 2010-75, will affect corporate tax departments across
the United States.
Part I of this Note briefly provides the foundational background
on financial statement preparation and the current rules regarding
tax accrual calculations. Part II then discusses the current status of
work-product doctrine with respect to tax accrual documentation,
including an analysis of the First Circuit's Textron decision. Part III
lays out the major policy arguments both for and against discoverabil-
ity of tax accrual documentation. Finally, Part IV considers the
upcoming transition to International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) and hypothesizes the consequences of the Textron decision
with respect to these new rules.
I. THE NECESSARY BACKGROUND: FIN 48 AND THE WORK-
PRODUCT PRIVILEGE
As a general matter, all publicly held companies in the United
States are required to file financial statements with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC),9 and the SEC requires that an indepen-
dent auditor must audit all financial statements in accordance with
8 See, e.g., Efrati, supra note 3 (discussing the reaction of corporate attorneys to
the Textron decision).
9 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006).
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Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS).1° The independent
auditor evaluates the company's financial statements relative to Gen-
erally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), which the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) promulgates, and then expresses
an opinion on whether the financial statements fairly present the
financial condition of the firm.1'
A. Accounting for Uncertain Tax Positions and FIN 48
More specific to tax accounting, GAAP requires publicly held cor-
porations to provide a reserve 12 for contingent tax liabilities and
uncertain tax benefits, 13 which includes estimates of potential liabili-
ties to the IRS if the IRS decides to challenge a corporation's positions
in its annual tax return. 14 To prepare its tax reserve, a corporation
reviews the positions it takes in its financial statements-that is, which
tax benefits the corporation intends to record-and determines the
likelihood that the position will be sustained after an IRS audit.
15 If it
is "more likely than not" that the tax position will be sustained on the
merits, then the "uncertain" tax position (UTP) can be recognized in
10 See 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(d) (2009) (requiring auditors to audit financial state-
ments in accordance with GAAS); see also DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATrHEWJ. BAMuETr,
ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 199 (4th ed. 2006) (explaining how the requirement affects
the demand for auditing services).
11 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(d). Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.),
the newly created Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has stated
that auditors must examine documentation underlying the numbers and assertions
published in the financial statements, and if the audited company refuses to produce
the documentation, the auditor must decide whether the omission of such underlying
documentation is material to the auditor's opinion on whether the financial state-
ments are produced in conformity with GAAP. Andrew Golodny, Note, Lawyers Versus
Auditors: Disclosure to Auditors and Potential Waiver of Work-Product Privilege in United
States v. Textron, 61 TAx LAW. 621, 630-31 (2008).
12 A "reserve," as used in this Note, refers to a liability that is recorded when
uncertainty exists about the amount or timing of the transfer of the economic bene-
fits that the obligation's payment or satisfaction will entail. HERWITZ & BARRETr, supra
note 10, at 1125.
13 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS No. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES 5-6, 8 (Mar. 1975), available at http://
www.fasb.org/pdf/fas5.pdf.
14 United States v. Textron Inc., 557 F.3d 21, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc).
15 Claudine Pease-Wingenter, The Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Tax
Accrual Workpapers: The Real Legacy ofUnited States v. Textron, 8 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J.
337, 339 (2008).
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the corporation's financial statements. 16  Corporations prepare
workpapers to support their treatment of UTPs; these workpapers
generally contain counsel opinions on the likelihood that the corpora-
tion's UTPs will be sustained in the event of an IRS audit.17 There-
fore, these workpapers list the "soft spots" of a corporation's tax
return, which "could potentially serve as a 'roadmap' for the I.R.S. on
audit."18
Tax lawyers often play a prominent role in the decisionmaking
process for recognition of UTPs; consequently, many tax reserve
workpapers contain opinions from either in-house or outside counsel
regarding whether it is "more likely than not" that UTPs would be
sustained after an IRS audit. 19 As one scholar notes, "[w]here a tax
position involves any significant amount of uncertainty, an outside
opinion often will be the tax director's or CFO's best choice for docu-
menting a decision to recognize all or part of the benefits from the
position."20 Further, in undertaking their duty to evaluate a corpora-
tion's financial statements, independent auditors will most likely ask
to see the tax reserve workpapers, which may result in the waiver of
attorney-client privilege regarding the tax opinions expressed in those
workpapers. 21 To protect itself, then, a corporation generally would
prefer not to disclose these workpapers, and would be especially
averse to allowing the IRS to have access to them.
B. Hickman v. Taylor and the Origins of Rule 26(b)(3)
The work-product doctrine is intended to allow attorneys to pre-
pare for litigation without opposing counsel having access to their
thought processes, legal theories, or trial preparation work.22 It is
derived from the rule pronounced in Hickman v. Taylor,23 and is now
16 DANIELLE E. RoLaEs, AN ANALmSS OF FIN 48 § 1.01 (2009) ("[FASB Interpreta-
tion No. 48] answers the 'when' question by imposing a 'recognition threshold,'
which provides that a UTP can be recognized in the financial statements only if it is
'more likely than not' . . . of being sustained on the merits . .
17 Pease-Wingenter, supra note 15, at 339.
18 Id.
19 Paul McCord, Circling Sharks: Toward a Better Understanding of the Tax Lauyer's
Role Under Circular 230, FN 48 and the Work-Product Doctrine, 34 MICH. TAX L. 26, 27
(2008).
20 Id.
21 Id. This waiver of attorney-client privilege will not be fully explored in this
Note, but is a significant issue for many corporations. See United States v. Arthur
Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984).
22 Ricardo Col6n, Comment, Caution: Disclosures of Attorney Work Product to Inde-
pendent Auditors May Waive the Privilege, 52 Loy. L. REV. 115, 123 (2006).
23 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) (3). In Hickman, the
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not discover the defen-
dant attorney's notes taken while interrogating a witness. 24 The Hick-
man Court specifically held that an attorney's mental impressions were
not discoverable because "[p]roper preparation of a client's case
demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be
the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and
plan his strategy without undue and needless interference." 25 The
Hickman Court continued by stating its policy considerations:
Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand,
much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten.
An attorney's thoughts . . . would not be his own. Inefficiency,
unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giv-
ing of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The
effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the inter-
ests of the clients and the cause ofjustice would be poorly served.2 6
Rule 26(b) (3) codified Hickman's work-product doctrine. Rule
26(b) (3) states that documents prepared "in anticipation of litigation
or for trial" by an opposing party or his representative are generally
not discoverable, absent a showing of undue hardship. 27 Basing the
codification on Hickman's policy concerns, the Advisory Committee
enacted Rule 26(b) (3) because it deemed that "each side's informal
evaluation of its case should be protected, that each side should be
encouraged to prepare independently, and that one side should not
automatically have the benefit of detailed preparatory work of the
other side."2 8 However, Rule 26(b) (3) also states that its protection
can be overcome by showing a "substantial need" of the documents
and the inability, "without undue hardship," to obtain equivalent doc-
uments through other means. 29
Rule 26(b) (3) is broader than the attorney-client privilege in that
it protects more than just communications between an attorney and
his client.30 The reason behind the work-product doctrine's breadth
is that it protects the adversarial system and an attorney's thoughts
24 Id. at 510.
25 Id. at 511.
26 Id.
27 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3) ("Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and
tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for
another party or its representative . . ").
28 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3) advisory committee's note.
29 Id. R. 26(b)(3)(A) (ii).
30 Charles M. Yablon & Steven S. Sparling, United States v. Adlman: Protection for
Corporate Work Product?, 64 BRooiL L. REv. 627, 633 (1998).
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and impressions in preparation for litigation; alternatively, the attor-
ney-client privilege seeks only to preserve candor in the lawyer-client
relationship. 3' Finally, the work-product doctrine may be waived in a
number of different ways. For example, work product protection is
waived if the material sought to be protected is disclosed "in a way
inconsistent with keeping it from an adversary." 32
C. Applying Rule 26(b)(3) to Auditing: United States v. Arthur Young
As a final prefatory note, Textron is not the first time the federal
court system has considered privilege and tax accrual workpapers;
nearly twenty years prior to the issuance of FIN 48, the Supreme Court
took up the issue in United States v. Arthur Young & Co. 3 3 In Arthur
Young, the IRS issued a summons to a corporation's independent
auditor requiring it to turn over tax accrual workpapers prepared dur-
ing its audit of the subject corporation. 34 The independent auditor
objected to the disclosure, arguing for the creation of an auditor-cli-
ent privilege for documents prepared by a corporation's auditors.35
The Supreme Court, holding that "the independent auditor assumes a
public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with
the client," refused to extend the work-product doctrine to account-
ant-client relationships.36 Therefore, the IRS had the right to obtain
tax accrual workpapers pursuant to its summons authority.37 How-
31 Id. at 633 n.35.
32 United States v. Mass. Inst. Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 687 (1st Cir. 1997). In M/T,
the First Circuit held that actions inconsistent with keeping work product protection
include disclosure to an adversary, a potential adversary, or a conduit to adversaries.
Id. Further, there may be no waiver of work product protection if disclosure is made
to a party under a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. See United States v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 295 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that work protec-
tion applied where parties had a common interest at the time of disclosure as well as
afterwards when the parties' interests diverged).
33 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
34 Id. at 808-09.
35 See id. at 809-10, 815.
36 Id. at 817. The Court emphasized that "work-product doctrine was founded
upon the private attorney's role as the client's confidential adviser and advocate,"
whereas the accountant's "'public watchdog' function demands that the accountant
maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidel-
ity to the public trust." Id. at 817-18.
37 Pease-Wingenter, supra note 15, at 342. However, prior to the Supreme
Court's opinion in the case, the IRS issued new guidelines mandating that tax accrual
workpapers were only to be accessed in unusual circumstances. Arthur Young, 465
U.S. at 821 n.17. In 2002, the IRS broadened its policy, permitting the request of tax
accrual workpapers pertaining to Listed Transactions, and, if the taxpayer failed to
disclose or participated in several Listed Transactions during the period, the IRS
[VOL. 86:2
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ever, the Arthur Young court did recognize that traditional privileges,
including the work- product privilege, applied when the IRS issues a
summons; it simply refused to create an additional accountant-client
privilege in those situations. 38
Arthur Young's "public responsibility" terminology is also the start-
ing point for the debate as to whether an independent auditor is a
"potential adversary," and whether an entity's work product protec-
tion is waived by disclosure to its auditors.3 9 While courts have ruled
both ways, the emerging trend is to consider both the company and
the auditor to share a common interest in the preparation of financial
statements. 40 As such, work product protection is generally not
waived because a company discloses work product to that auditor.41
II. INTERPRETING "IN THE ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION"
While the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to speak directly on the
subject, the Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied Rule 26(b) (3)'s
"in anticipation of litigation" standard differently. Under the Fifth
Circuit's "primary purpose" test, a document is prepared "in anticipa-
tion of litigation" if the principal or exclusive purpose of the docu-
ment is to assist in litigation.42 Alternatively, under the "because of'
test, documents prepared because of the potential for litigation or
could request all of a company's tax accrual workpapers. Pease-Wingenter, supra
note 15, at 341.
38 Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 816; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 398 (1981) (holding that the IRS summons authority remains "subject to tradi-
tional privileges and limitations," including privileges regarding attorney work
product).
39 Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 817.
40 Golodny, supra note 11, at 634. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny
Energy Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("A business and its auditor can and
should be aligned insofar as they both seek to prevent, detect, and root out corporate
fraud."). But see Medinol Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 214 F.R.D 113, 116 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) ("[I]n order for auditors to properly do their job, they must not share common
interests with the company they audit.").
41 Additionally, waiver of work product privilege only occurs when a party acts
inconsistently with work product protection. United States v. Mass. Inst. Tech., 129
F.3d 681, 687 (1st Cir. 1997); see, e.g., Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 176, 183 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (stating that the work-product privi-
lege may be waived for disclosures made "in a manner which substantially increases
the opportunity for potential adversaries to obtain the information," (quoting Vardon
Golf Co. v. Karsten Mfg. Corp., 213 F.R.D. 528, 534 (N.D. Ill. 2003))); In re Raytheon
Sec. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 354, 360 (D. Mass. 2003) (holding that waiver of work-product
privilege also occurs when there is disclosure to a "conduit" to a potential adversary).
42 Col6n, supra note 22, at 125.
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documents analyzing the outcome of litigation are protected under
Rule 26(b) (3)-a more generous standard.43
A. The "Primary Purpose" Test
The Fifth Circuit holds that documents are only protected under
Rule 26(b) (3) when the primary purpose of creating the documents is
to aid in litigation. 44 In United States v. El Paso Co.,45 El Paso, a large
public corporation, sought to protect "tax pool analysis" documents
summarizing the corporation's contingent tax liabilities that could be
subject to IRS challenge. 46 The Fifth Circuit rejected El Paso's argu-
ments, holding that the documents were prepared primarily to com-
ply with securities laws, and not in conjunction with anticipated
litigation.47 The Fifth Circuit specifically noted that El Paso employed
outside counsel to assist with its litigation claims, yet its in-house staff
prepared the tax pool analysis documents without any assistance from
outside counsel. 48 Further, the tax pool analysis documents were pre-
pared after El Paso filed its tax return, 49 and related to more general
(as opposed to specific) litigation concerns. 50
The primary purpose rule has been criticized, in part, because
Rule 26(b) (3) does not mandate that a document be prepared prima-
rily or exclusively to assist in litigation in order to merit protection-a
more lenient "in anticipation of litigation" phrasing is used.51 Fur-
ther, protection under the Rule is broader than simply those docu-
ments prepared exclusively for actions directly involved with
43 Id.
44 Yablon & Sparling, supra note 30, at 640-41.
45 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982).
46 Yablon & Sparling, supra note 30, at 639. El Paso had its in-house staff spend
over ten thousand hours annually preparing its tax return, which included the crea-
tion of these tax-pool documents. Id.
47 El Paso, 682 F.2d at 543.
El Paso establishes its non-current tax account to bring its financial books
into conformity with generally accepted auditing principles.... The pri-
mary motivating force behind the tax pool analysis, therefore, is not to ready
El Paso for litigation over its tax returns. Rather, the primary motivation is
to anticipate, for financial reporting purposes, what the impact of litigation
might be on the company's tax liability.
Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 534.
50 It at 534-35.
51 United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998).
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litigation.52 As the Second Circuit articulated, "[i]f the drafters of
[Rule 26(b) (3)] intended to limit its protection to documents made
to assist in preparation for litigation, this would have been adequately
conveyed by the phrase 'prepared . . . for trial."' 53 In reading Rule
26(b) (3) broadly, the Second Circuit opted to minimize references to
"trial preparation materials" both in the caption to the Rule and in
the advisory committee notes.54
B. The "Because of" Test
The more frequently applied interpretation 55 of Rule 26(b) (3)'s
"in anticipation of litigation" verbiage is commonly known as the
"because of' test. The "because of' test states that a document falls
within the protection of the work-product doctrine if "in light of the
nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular
case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or
obtained because of the prospect of litigation."56
1. United States v. AdIman
In United States v. Adlman,57 the Second Circuit directly applied
the "because of' test to dual purpose tax documentation-documen-
tation prepared to aid both the financial statements and the tax
return. In Adiman, the defendant sought to protect a memorandum
that evaluated the tax implications of a proposed corporate restructur-
ing plan and included a detailed legal analysis of any likely IRS chal-
52 Id. ("Nowhere does Rule 26(b) (3) state that a document must have been pre-
pared to aid in the conduct of litigation in order to constitute work product, must less
primarily or exclusively to aid in litigation.").
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1199.
55 According to one scholar's count, perhaps nine of the thirteen circuits have
adopted the "because of" test. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits apply the "because of" standard. See DennisJ. Ventry,
Jr., A Primer on Tax Work Productfor Federal Courts, 123 TAX NoTEs 875, 877 n.20 (2009)
(listing the various circuits that have applied the "because of" test).
56 Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202 (quoting 8 CHARLEs ALAN WRiGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACnCE AND PROCEDURE § 2024, at 343 (1994)). There is some debate as to whether
the "because of" test is equivalent to a "but for" standard. Later courts, such as the
District Court of Rhode Island in United States v. Textron, 507 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.R.I.
2007), have used "but for" terminology when interpreting the "because of" standard.
Id. at 150. However, a "but for" standard may be broader than what was intended in
the wording of Rule 26(b) (3), as it "casts a much wider net to include materials that
are not necessarily useful in such litigation." Pease-Wingenter, supra note 15, at 346.
57 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998).
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lenges to that plan.5 8 In holding that the work-product doctrine
protected the memorandum, the Second Circuit stated that "[w] here
a document is created because of the prospect of litigation, analyzing
the likely outcome of that litigation, it does not lose protection under
this formulation merely because it is created in order to assist with a
business decision."5 9 In so holding, the Second Circuit expressly
rejected the Fifth Circuit's primary purpose test and refused to
embark on an analysis of whether the primary intent of the memoran-
dum was to comply with securities regulations or prepare for potential
IRS litigation.60
Additionally, the Second Circuit attempted to define a test for
determining whether a dual-purpose document was created "because
of" potential litigation, and thus was privileged under Rule 26(b) (3).61
Specifically, the Second Circuit held that "[w]here a document was
created because of anticipated litigation, and would not have been
prepared in substantially similar form but for the prospect of that litiga-
tion, it falls within Rule 26(b) (3)o,,62 Therefore, a document prepared
in the ordinary course of business or "that would have been created in
essentially similar form irrespective of litigation" is specifically
excepted from the Second Circuit's holding.63
From a tax accrual documentation perspective, Adlman's "sub-
stantially similar" holding is both significant and confounding. The
Second Circuit provided valuable guidance in the debate as to what
constitutes unprotected "ordinary course of business" documentation
and similar, yet protected, "in anticipation of litigation" documents. 64
However, it left the tasks of defining "substantially similar" and decid-
ing what differences are material to the evaluation of similarity to later
58 Id. at 1195.
59 Id. at 1202. The Sixth Circuit later adopted this Adlman analysis in United States
v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006). In Roxworthy, the general counsel for Yum!
Brands asserted work-product privilege over two memoranda prepared by its indepen-
dent auditor, KPMG, regarding stock transfers and the creation of an insurance com-
pany. The Sixth Circuit held that work-product doctrine protected the memoranda,
even though the IRS audit had not begun and the tax return had yet to be filed. Id. at
593.
60 Adlman, 134 F.3d at- 1197-98.
61 By "dual purpose," it is meant that the document can be used both to aid in
business purposes and to prepare for potential IRS litigation.
62 Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195 (emphasis added).
63 Id. at 1202; see also FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (3) advisory committee's note, quoted
in Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202 ("Materials assembled in the ordinary course of business
... are not under the qualified immunity provided by this subdivision.").
64 See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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courts.6 5 In fact, at least one scholar argues that the eventual interpre-
tation of "substantially similar" may end up being quite comparable to
the "primary purpose" test-a test the Adlman court specifically
rejected. 66
2. United States v. Textron Inc.
Over a decade after the Adlman decision, the First Circuit
adopted the "because of' test for tax accrual documentation, but
came to a markedly different result. In United States v. Textron Inc., the
First Circuit, attempting to draw a line between case preparation
materials and tax documents, 67 held that Textron's tax accrual docu-
mentation was prepared to support judgments found in its financial
statements and did not merit work product protection simply because
"the subject matter of a document relates to a subject that might con-
ceivably be litigated." 68 In Textron, the IRS issued a summons for Tex-
tron's tax accrual documentation relating to nine transactions it
flagged as possible tax shelters subject to taxpayer abuse. 69 Rejecting
the district court's conclusion that the documentation was prepared
"because of' the prospect of litigation, the First Circuit concluded that
"the Textron workpapers were independently required by statutory
and audit requirements" and did not merit work product protection. 70
Further, the Textron majority referred back to the language of
Rule 26(b) (3) in an attempt to curb the excessive application of the
65 See Yablon & Sparling, supra note 30, at 649 ("Adlman gives no guidance as to
how different a document needs to be from its ordinary business counterpart in order
to confer work-product protection.").
66 Id. at 649-50 ("Indeed, it is quite conceivable that the Adiman court might
have reached the same result that the Fifth Circuit came to in El Paso by focusing not
on the purpose of the documents but on their preparation in connection with regula-
tory requirements.").
67 United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 2009).
68 Id. at 29.
69 Id. at 23-34. More specifically, the IRS maintains a set of "listed transactions"
that it deems to be frequent vehicles for tax evasion. Taxpayers who incur these trans-
actions, which can be defined as a form of tax shelter, are generally required to dis-
close and register the transaction with the IRS. Ventry, supra note 55, at 881 n.77.
One such transaction is a sale-in, lease-out (SILO) transaction, which allows tax-
exempt or tax-indifferent organizations to transfer certain income deductions to tax-
payers who seek such deductions as a tax shelter. Textron, 577 F.3d at 24. In this case,
Textron engaged in a number of these transactions, and the IRS sought the tax
accrual documentation as a means to evaluate their collective legitimacy. Id. For a
transaction to be legitimate, there must be some motive for the sale or lease other
than tax avoidance. It
70 Textron, 577 F.3d at 26. A First Circuit panel also upheld the district court's
decision before granting a rehearing en banc. Id.
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work-product doctrine to corporate documentation: "[It is not]
enough that the materials were prepared by lawyers or represent legal
thinking. Much corporate material prepared in law offices or
reviewed by lawyers falls in that vast category. It is only work done in
anticipation of or for trial that is protected."71 Asserting that it
adhered to Adiman's precedent,72 the majority maintained that the
summoned workpapers also did not merit work product protection
because the documents were prepared in the ordinary course of
business. 73
Finally, the Textron majority articulated the policy considerations
that motivated its holding. First, it stated that the work product privi-
lege was aimed at protecting the litigation process and "work done by
counsel to help him or her in litigating a case," as opposed to generic
corporate documentation.7 4 Second, the majority noted that the con-
cerns about discouraging lawsuit preparation were not present in Tex-
tron's factual scenario, in part because Textron had to prepare the tax
audit workpapers in order to produce audited financial statements
and comply with federal securities laws. 75 Lastly, the majority rejected
any argument of unfairness toward Textron in its decision, asserting
that "tax collection is not a game" and "[u] nderpaying taxes threatens
the essential public interest in revenue collection." 76
However, the 3-2 decision for the IRS was supplemented by a
stinging dissent from Judge Torruella, joined by Judge Lipez. The dis-
sent characterized the majority's test not as keeping with the "because
of" standard, but as creating a new "prepared for use in litigation"
test.77 Using the AdIman case as its foundation, the dissent criticized
several generalities the majority used to support its demarcation
between tax documents and case preparation materials, including the
71 Id. at 29-30.
72 The First Circuit adopted AdIman's "because of" test in Maine v. United States
Department of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2002). In Maine, the issue was whether
documents relating to an endangered species listing were protected under the work-
product doctrine. In reversing the district court's decision in Maine, the First Circuit
specifically rejected the Fifth Circuit's "primary purpose" test on which the district
court had relied in coming to its conclusion. Id. at 68.
73 Textron, 577 F.3d at 30.
74 Id. at 30-31.
75 Id. at 31. Additionally, Textron had shown its spreadsheets to its independent
auditor, Ernst & Young, and the IRS summons also applied to workpapers created by
Ernst & Young in determining the adequacy of the reserves. Id. at 24. The district
court thus concluded that any attorney-client privilege had been waived through the
disclosure, but work-product privilege had not been waived. Id. at 25.
76 Id. at 31.
77 Id at 34 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
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argument that "' [elvery lawyer who tries cases knows the touch and
feel of materials prepared for a current or possible . . . law Suit.'"78
Additionally, the dissent articulated some convincing policy ratio-
nales of its own. First, it argued that the majority's holding is contrary
to the goal of work product protection-protecting an attorney's "pri-
vacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their
counsel."79 Second, the litigation percentages calculated by Textron's
counsel in its workpaper represent the exact type of mental impres-
sions that the work-product doctrine strives to protect.80 Lastly, the
quality of legal representation will diminish under the majority's rule,
as, contrary to the majority's assertion, lawyers will not prepare the
detailed estimates like those contained in Textron's documentation if
the IRS may easily discover such estimates.81
C. The Discoverability of Tax Accrual Workpapers After Textron
After Textron, the federal court system is now faced with at least a
two-way, and possibly a three-way,8 2 circuit split regarding the IRS's
ability to access a corporation's tax accrual workpapers. The Fifth Cir-
cuit stands alone in its belief that documents are only protected under
Rule 26(b) (3) when the primary purpose of creating the documents is
to aid in litigation.8 3 However, at least six, and arguably seven, circuit
courts allow for broader protection of workpaper documentation so
long as the documentation is prepared because of the potential for
litigation or to analyze the outcome of that potential litigation.8 4
78 Id. (quoting id. at 30 (majority opinion)).
79 Id. at 35. The dissent goes on to quote Adlman, saying that there is "no basis
for adopting a test under which an attorney's assessment of the likely outcome of
litigation is freely available to his litigation adversary merely because the document
was created for a business purpose rather than for litigation assistance." Id. at 36
(quoting United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1200 (2d Cir. 1998)).
80 Id. at 36. In fact, the dissent points out that the IRS itself had sought the
protection of the work-product doctrine in similar circumstances in a previous case.
Id. In Delaney, Migdail & Young, Chartered v. IRS, 826 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the
IRS sought to protect business purpose documents prepared by IRS attorneys to aid in
deciding whether to adopt a new sampling system for its large corporate audits. Id. at
125-26; see Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1201 ("[In [Delaney], the IRS successfully argued
against the very position it here advocates.").
81 Textron, 577 F.3d at 36-37 (Torruella, J., dissenting). The dissent notes that
Textron is only required to satisfy evidentiary standards set forth by GAAP, which may
not contain the form and detail of the workpapers at issue. Id. at 37.
82 The circuit split could be considered a three-way split if one accepts the Textron
dissent's argument that a new standard was created in that case.
83 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
84 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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Finally, as the dissent in Textron argues, the First Circuit may have
adopted a separate approach, concluding that documents are only
protected work-product if they are prepared for any litigation or
trial . 5 In May 2010, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Tex-
tron case and, in doing so, opted not to resolve the circuit split on this
topic and more clearly define the boundaries of work product protec-
tion in the federal court system.8
6
III. A POLICY MATTER: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
DISCOVERABILITY OF WORKPAPERS
As courts and legal scholars line up on different sides of the "in
anticipation of litigation" debate introduced in Part II, several recur-
ring policies have come to the forefront and shaped that debate.
Before delving into an analysis of Textron in the context of interna-
tional accounting standards, it is a worthwhile exercise to examine
these policy arguments, which, for efficiency's sake, can be lumped
into three general categories: the balance between the adversarial sys-
tem and procedural efficiency, the preservation of quality legal repre-
sentation, and the importance of truthfulness in reporting tax
liability.
A. Protecting the Adversarial System
The starting point for the debate about the discoverability of tax
accrual workpapers is the intent of Rule 26(b) (3). Proponents of the
discoverability of tax workpapers, such as the Textron majority, argue
that Rule 26(b) (3) was designed to protect the litigation process, and
should be restricted only to work done by lawyers in preparing to actu-
ally litigate a case. 87 Therefore, extending the work product privilege
to documents that analyze the effects of a UTP in the event that litiga-
tion occurs defeats the purpose of the privilege and harms the adver-
sarial process.88
At least one scholar, Professor Dennis Ventry, argues that tax
accrual workpapers can never be protected under the work product
privilege because preparers "can never possess an objectively reasona-
85 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
86 United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 3320 (2010).
87 Id. at 30-31; see also United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir.
1982) (stating that the work-product doctrine "is not an umbrella that shades all
materials prepared by a lawyer").
88 Ventry, supra note 55, at 880.
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ble belief that litigation is likely.' 89 The reason, Professor Ventry
argues, is that so few IRS audits result in litigation that the "in antici-
pation of litigation" standard can never be met9 °:
It is never reasonable as a matter of logic or mathematical
probability for a taxpayer to anticipate litigation with the IRS when
preparing tax accrual workpapers. It is highly unlikely that the gov-
ernment will identify an abusive transaction in a corporate tax-
payer's consolidated return or that it will glean sufficient
information from the return and disclosure documents to ade-
quately evaluate the transaction's true substance and challenge it on
the merits.9 1
In Professor Ventry's view, an IRS audit does not merit an adver-
sarial proceeding-it is an assessment and review process92-and chal-
lenged transactions may go through several levels of administrative
review and alternative dispute resolution before they result in an
adversarial litigation process.93 "Even if the government manages to
identify, investigate, and dispute a particular transaction, the parties
will manage to exhaust all avenues of dispute resolution over pro-
posed adjustments only in exceedingly rare circumstances. 9 4
However, there are several opponents to discoverability of tax
accrual workpapers that disagree with Professor Ventry. Judge Tor-
ruella, dissenting in Textron, succinctly summarized the opponents'
view:
Textron's [tax accrual workpapers] contain exactly the sort of
mental impressions about the case that Hickman sought to protect.
In fact, these percentages contain counsel's ultimate impression of
the value of the case.... With this information, the IRS will be able
to immediately identify weak spots and know exactly how much Tex-
tron should be willing to spend to settle each item. Indeed, the IRS
explicitly admits that this is its purpose in seeking the documents.95
In other words, returning to the spirit of Hickman, opponents to
discoverability contend that allowing the IRS to access tax accrual
workpapers would undermine the adversarial system. Just as the Hick-
man Court contended that access to a lawyer's mental impressions
89 Id. at 880-82.
90 Id. at 882.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 880.
93 Id. at 881.
94 Id. at 882.
95 United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 36 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J.,
dissenting).
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during a deposition would be "demoralizing" to the profession, 96
revealing assessments of success at trial to one's adversary through tax
workpapers would defeat the ability of lawyers to protect the interests
of their clients in litigation.97
Further, opponents to discoverability argue that the supposed
extension of the work-product doctrine is not an unfair broadening of
Rule 26(b) (3). Instead, providing for protection of tax accrual
workpapers embodies a fair legal principle that the privacy of lawyers
should be protected in advocating for their clients; and, while it does
limit the discoverability of some memoranda and workpapers, the
work-product doctrine still allows for their discovery upon the demon-
stration of a substantial need.98 As such, placing tax accrual
workpapers under the work-product doctrine's protective umbrella
appropriately balances the interests of corporate counsel and the
IRS's need to ensure adequate reporting.99
B. Quality of Legal Representation
Related to their concerns about preserving the adversarial system,
opponents to discoverability also argue that allowing access to tax
accrual workpapers threatens the ability of corporate attorneys to pro-
vide candid assessments of their clients' legal positions.100 As Judge
Torruella articulated, "if attorneys who identify good faith questions
and uncertainties in their clients' tax returns know that putting such
information in writing will result in discovery by the IRS, they will be
more likely to avoid putting it in writing, thus diminishing the quality
of representation." 10' Indeed, if corporate counsel knew that oppos-
ing counsel would evaluate her professional judgment with each writ-
ten memorandum she produced, it is very likely that she would
provide less detail in her documents so as to confer less benefit on her
96 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
97 Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and Asso-
ciation of Corporate Counsel Supporting Textron Inc. and in Favor of Affirmance at
5, United States v. Textron Inc., 557 F.3d 21 (2009) (No. 09-750) [hereinafter Brief for
ACCI.
98 Id.
99 Brief for the Committee on Taxation and Committee on Corporate Reporting
of Financial Executives International as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee Tex-
tron Inc. Supporting Affirmance at 11, United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (2009)
(No. 09-750) [hereinafter Brief for CCR].
100 Id. at 7.
101 Textron, 577 F.3d at 36-37 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
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adversary.10 2 As such, the related tax reserve would be less substanti-
ated than if the documents were not discoverable.103
Proponents for discoverability reject this argument, asserting that
securities laws require these workpapers to be created anyway in con-
junction with the preparation of financial statements.1 04 Tax accrual
workpapers, they argue, support a corporation's financial disclosures
in its financial statements, and if corporate counsel chose not to
include its analysis of upcoming tax disputes, then the corporation's
independent auditors could not issue a clean bill of health-an
unqualified opinion that the financial statements are presented fairly
in accordance with GAAP-that is required for all publicly traded
entities. 10 5 As such, the standards to which independent auditors
must adhere require that corporate counsel provide its assessment of
potential tax litigation, whether or not the analysis constitutes privi-
leged work product.10 6 "Litigation does not trigger a corporate tax-
payer's financial reporting obligations . . [t]he disclosure
requirements ... force the corporate taxpayer to evaluate which tax
positions might be challenged ... [t]o that end, workpapers contain
percentage determinations on the likelihood of success of prevailing
on the merits of specific tax positions."10 7
102 Id. at 37. However, there are several ways in which an entity can improve its
chances for succeeding on a work-product privilege claim against the IRS. One
scholar suggests that ensuring that workpapers are prepared exclusively by licensed
attorneys, including legal references to explain legal ambiguity, and avoiding the dis-
tribution of tax accrual workpapers to third parties, whenever possible, are three pri-
mary ways to increase the likelihood of sustaining a work-product privilege claim.
Further, when providing workpapers to independent auditors, entities may consider
preparing a separate set of documentation about the reserve that includes as little
attorney analysis and opinion as possible. See Pease-Wingenter, supra note 15, at 353.
103 Textron, 577 F.3d at 37 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 31-32 (majority opinion).
105 Ventry, supra note 55, at 883. Additionally, because the Supreme Court in
Arthur Young held that there is no auditor-client privilege, "the auditor is ethically and
professionally obligated to ascertain for himself as far as possible whether the corpora-
tion's contingent tax liabilities have been accurately stated." United States v. Arthur
Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984). Therefore, independent auditors are
required to seek out the litigation analysis of tax disputes that the corporation seeks
to protect.
106 Textron, 577 F.3d at 31-32.
107 Ventry, supra note 55, at 879-80. Professor Ventry also points out that tax
accrual workpapers are also often created by non-lawyer tax practitioners, and
.unprotected accounting documents do not magically become protected litigation
documents by virtue of being created by a lawyer rather than an accountant." Id. at
883.
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However, discoverability opponents respond that the purpose of
tax accrual workpapers is not so clear. Instead, the dual-purpose
nature of tax accrual workpapers-both as an evaluation of litigation
risks and as a means to provide the necessary supporting documenta-
tion to auditors-precludes any claim that they are solely a result of
compliance with securities laws. 108 As the Textron dissent pointed out,
while accounting standards do require some substantiation of the tax
reserve numbers displayed on a corporation's financial statements,
these standards do not require a set amount of detail for each UTP. 109
As a result, the amount of detail provided in these workpapers may
vary depending on the needs of the independent auditor. Further,
"the fact that accounting firms are required to review these
workpapers as part of their own due diligence regarding the accuracy
of the financial statements also does not change the character of the
workpapers."l"0
C. Truthfulness in Financial Reporting
The Textron majority sums up its side of the third and final gen-
eral policy debate succinctly: "tax collection is not a game." '111 In
other words, the nature of tax collection, and the benefit to society
produced through tax collection, mandates that the IRS should be
able to discover a taxpayer's tax accrual documents. 1 2 The IRS is at a
disadvantage in collecting taxes from entities which seek to obscure
their true tax liability at every opportunity; for example, the docu-
ments at issue in Textron filled nine four-drawer file cabinets, and its
consolidated tax return alone exceeded 4,000 pages and 190 different
entities. 113 Even after the IRS expended considerable effort to target
108 Michelle M. Henkel, Textron Eviscerates the 60-Year-Old Work Product Privilege,
125 TAx Nomxs 237 (2009). In fact, the Second Circuit in Adlman expressly stated
that risk assessments are "a classic example of work product." United States v.
Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196-97 (1998). Therefore, work-product advocates argue
that tax accrual workpapers, which assess the chance of success in litigation if an
uncertain tax benefit is taken, are by their nature risk assessments and should be
considered under the umbrella of the work-product doctrine. Henkel, supra; see also
Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that individ-
ual litigation reserve figures are protected from discovery under the work-product
privilege, as they "reveal the mental impressions, thoughts, and conclusions of an
attorney in evaluating a legal claim").
109 Textron, 577 F.3d at 37 (TorruellaJ., dissenting).
110 Henkel, supra note 108.
111 Textron, 577 F.3d at 31.
112 Id.
113 Ventry, supra note 55, at 881. Professor Ventry contends that due to "funding
and personnel deficiencies," it is not certain that IRS officials would have been able to
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nine contested transactions, it could not fully understand those trans-
actions without analyzing the supporting tax accrual workpapers.
114
Access to these workpapers would help the IRS fully evaluate the taxa-
ble nature of the disputed transactions, as access would help "verify
the accuracy and completeness of return positions, clarify turbid facts
and data, reveal unidentified issues and positions, and expose infor-
mation hidden from view on transaction documents." 1
15
Additionally, considering that taxpayer contributions are the
means supporting the IRS's efforts, the cat-and-mouse game that fre-
quently occurs during IRS audits imposes a considerable cost on soci-
ety. If the IRS were able to access a taxpaying entity's tax accrual
workpapers, this societal cost could be reduced through a more effi-
cient tax audit and litigation process. 1 6 Moreover, the motivating fac-
tor behind IRS audits is to uncover the truth regarding an entity's tax
liability.117 Even opponents to discoverability admit that "the integrity
and fairness of our tax system relies in significant part on the willing-
ness of all taxpayers to comply voluntarily with their tax reporting
obligations."1 18 Considering the serious informational disadvantage
from which the IRS operates, its commendable goal should merit
assistance in legally uncertain situations.
Discoverability opponents object to this line of thinking. "The
scope of the work-product doctrine should not depend on what party
is asserting it."119 Instead, they point to the powerful tools the IRS
already has at its disposal in collecting taxes-namely, the IRS sum-
mons (threatened or actual) and the ability to impose federal penal-
ties.1 20 With these weapons in its arsenal, the playing field on which
the IRS and corporate taxpayers operate is much more level than dis-
coverability proponents claim.1 21 Further, the IRS's desire for more
efficient investigations into UTPs-its admitted motivation in Tex-
find and evaluate the SILO transactions implicated in Textron. Id. While new efforts
to make tax positions more transparent, such as the requirement to complete Sched-
ule M-3 and Form 8271, assist in locating evasive tax shelters, the IRS cannot possibly
examine and understand an entity's tax positions from these forms alone. Id.
114 Id.
115 See id.
116 See generally id. ("[Tiax accrual workpapers help the IRS verify the accuracy
and completeness of return positions, clarify turbid facts and data, reveal unidentified
issues and positions, and expose information hidden from view on transaction
documents.").
117 Textron, 577 F.3d at 31.
118 Brief for CCR, supra note 99, at 14.
119 Textron, 577 F.3d at 37 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
120 Brief for CCR, supra note 99, at 14-15.
121 Id. at 15-16.
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tron12 2 -should not deprive corporate attorneys of the privacy they
need to support their clients. 123
IV. A CHANGING WORLD: IFRS AND THE DISCOVERABILITY OF TAx
ACCRUAL WORKPAPERS
A. IAS 12 and the Move to IFRS
In November 2008, the SEC published a roadmap that could
require all SEC-registered companies to prepare their financial state-
ments in accordance with International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards (IFRS) by 2014.124 In moving to IFRS, the SEC seeks to create a
uniform accounting standard that would help investors compare
financial statements between U.S. and foreign companies.1 25 Cur-
rently, IFRS are used instead of GAAP in over one hundred countries,
but not in the United States. 12 6
With respect to income taxes, the implementation of IFRS-
which is assisted by a convergence project between the FASB and the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)-would likely
mean that a new standard would displace FIN 48 as the authoritative
standard in accounting for UTPs. Currently, the LASB's standard for
accounting for income taxes, International Accounting Standard
(IAS) 12, does not explicitly address accounting for UTPs.127 In prac-
tice, IAS 12 companies generally record liabilities for UTPs that do
not meet FIN 48's more-likely-than-not threshold by using either a
probability-weighted-average approach or a single-best-estimate
approach.1 28
122 Textron, 577 F.3d at 36 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
123 Brief for ACC, supra note 97, at 15.
124 Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accor-
dance with International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, 73 Fed. Reg.
70816 (proposed Nov. 21, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
2008/33-8982fr.pdf. The Roadmap also provides that the SEC will decide in 2011
whether it will proceed with the timeline that has most U.S. companies transitioning
to IFRS in 2014. Id. However, the recent financial crisis may push back the timeline
to some extent, in an attempt to lessen the compliance burden on financially
strapped businesses. James Dornbrook, Accountants Hold Off on Switch to International
Standards, KAN. CrrT Bus. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at 5, available at http://kansascity.bizjour-
nals.com/kansascity/stories/2009/02/23/storyl13.html.
125 See Dornbrook, supra note 124.
126 Rolfes, supra note 16, § 1.10.
127 Tami Van Tassel et al., Income Tax Accounting Under IFRS: Uncertain Tax Posi-
tions, SEC. L. DAILY (june 4, 2009).
128 Id. "Under a single-best-estimate approach, highly certain tax positions may
have resulted in a full benefit being recognized. Conversely, under a probability-
weighted average approach, some level of reserve may be recorded." Id
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On March 31, 2009, as part of the aforementioned international
convergence project, the LASB released an initial proposal, or expo-
sure draft, to replace IAS 12.129 Among other proposals, the exposure
draft mandated that uncertain tax positions be measured at the
probability-weighted average of all possible outcomes.1 30 Therefore,
under the proposed standard, "whatever the probability of a tax posi-
tion not being upheld, a reserve equal to that probability must be cre-
ated on the books."131 In other words, whereas under FIN 48 a tax
benefit is only recognized for positions that are more-likely-than-not
to survive an IRS challenge, under the proposed international stan-
dard, a tax benefit is to be recognized based on the probability of
success, regardless of whether it met a stated recognition threshold. 13 2
For example, assume Company X has three potential tax liabilities,
each valued in full at $1,000,000. Position A has a 10% chance of
being upheld if challenged, while positions B and C have a 49% and a
95% chance, respectively. Under FIN 48, GAAP taxpayers could
record the liability in full for positions A and B, but would record no
tax reserve for position C. IFRS taxpayers, on the other hand, record
a liability for all three positions, including those that probably would
not succeed upon challenge (A and B). Indeed, IFRS taxpayers even
record a tax liability of $50,000 for position C, which has essentially no
chance of being overturned upon IRS challenge.
129 See Press Release, Int'l Accounting Standards Bd., IASB Seeks Comments on a
Proposed Standard on Income Tax Accounting (Mar. 31, 2009), available at http://
www.iasb.org/News/Press+Releases/IASB+seeks+comments+on+a+proposed+new+
standard+on+income+tax+accounting.htm.
130 Exposure Draft, Int'l Accounting Standards Bd., ED 2009/2, Income Tax
(Mar. 31, 2009).
131 Van Tassel et al., supra note 127. "For instance, a 60 percent chance of a posi-
tion not being sustained would trigger the creation of a reserve equal to 60 percent of
the value of the asserted benefit to cover the eventuality of it being disallowed." Id.
Like the guidance under FIN 48, companies using the new standard would assume
that the relevant tax authorities would be able to review the reported tax information
and have full knowledge of all pertinent records, and cannot take into account that a
particular tax position will go undetected. Id.
132 Id.
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TABLE 1. ANALYSIS OF TAX RESERVES UNDER FIN 48 AND LAS 12
PoiinAmount of Tax Likelihood of Contingent Liability ReservePosition PstoPosition Success Recorded
_GAA FIN 48) 11 IFRS (IAS 12)
A $1,000,000 10% $1,000,000 $900,000
B $1,000,000 49% $1,000,000 $510,000
c $1,000,000 95% $0 $50,000
Totals* $2,000,000 $1,460,092__
* The totals in this example do not carry much meaning in and of themselves,
because the accounting method that results in a higher recorded tax liability
depends on the nature of the UTPs on a corporation's books. For example,
assuming a corporation has multiple UTPs, each valued at the same amount,
then the corporation would record a higher tax reserve under FIN 48 only if the
majority of its positions had less than a 50% chance of success, as in this example.
Alternatively, assuming the same facts, if the majority of a corporation's positions
were more-likely-than-not to succeed (50.01% to 100%), then the corporation
would record a higher tax reserve under IAS 12. Because amounts or "values" of
various uncertain tax positions typically differ in magnitude, this example
oversimplifies reality. However, this example illustrates how material differences
can result when accounting for uncertain positions under the FIN 48 standard
and a probability-weighted average standard.
The LASB's proposed IFRS standard garnered some support from
the international tax community, but also met its fair share of criti-
cism, contributing to the IASB's decision to drop the proposed stan-
dard from its June 2011 convergence schedule.133  The most
commonly invoked criticism concerned the time and cost associated
with the transition from the FIN 48 standard to the IASB's proposed
standard. 134 Critics harped on the time needed to retrain personnel
and the burden of evaluating and assessing the probability of every
UTP-across every jurisdiction, no less. 135 In particular, many com-
menting firms-including some of the big four accounting firms-
noted that the proposed tax standard did not square with the
expected outcome of most tax disputes.136 These critics asserted that
a probability-weighted-average approach does not reflect the true
133 Thomas Jaworski, Latest FASB, IASB Convergence Plan Excludes Recent Income Tax
Proposal, 125 TAx NoTEs 661 (2009). The IASB will pursue further limited improve-
ments to lAS 12, potentially with the intent to attempt convergence with U.S. GAAP in
the future. See also Press Release, Int'l Accounting Standards Bd., FASB and IASB
Reaffirm Commitment to Memorandum of Understanding (Nov. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.iasb.org/News/Press+Releases/IASB+and+FASB+Reaffirm+Commitment
+to+Memorandum+of+Understanding.htm.
134 ThomasJaworski, IASB's Tax Uncertainties Method Portrayed as Burdensome in Pub-
lic Comments, TAx NoTEs, Aug. 12, 2009.
135 See id. (describing the reaction of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP to the pro-




measurement of UTPs, in part because taking a UTP can only result in
one of two outcomes: success in defending the position taken or rever-
sal of the position in defeat.137 Additionally, other firms expressed
concern about the reliability of estimates used to support the compu-
tation of UTPs, considering the lack of a minimum recognition
threshold.138 Because of these concerns, many commentators advised
against the proposed probability-weighted-average approach and
instead recommended an expected value model.13 9 Without a con-
verged income tax standard from the FASB and LASB, the SEC may
consider adopting IAS 12 as part of its IFRS implementation plan.
Further, if adopted, LAS 12 would probably require U.S. corporate tax-
payers to record liabilities for uncertain tax positions using the
probability-weighted average approach anyway.
140
B. Textron and the 1FRS Standard
In addition to its effects on the tax accounting world, a
probability-weighted-average approach, when viewed in conjunction
with the Textron decision, could have some serious legal ramifications
for corporate tax departments. In fact, these ramifications are already
being realized thanks to the IRS's recent announcement regarding
tax accrual workpapers. IRS Announcement 2010-75, released in Sep-
tember 2010, proscribes new regulations that require certain large
corporate taxpayers to rank uncertain tax positions (based on size) on
a new Schedule UTP accompanying their tax returns, and to specifi-
cally designate uncertain tax positions that account for more than
10% of its aggregate amount of the reserves for all positions reported
on Schedule UTP.141 While the total dollar amount of the tax reserve
137 See id. (quoting Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International's Ken Wild, who
argues that the probability-weighted approach produces an "'outcome in respect of
each item that rarely represents any particular expected outcomes,'" and the sum of
the estimates under the approach would "'rarely represent the overall outcome that
the entity may expect in relation to the tax return as a whole'").
138 Id.
139 Id. It should be noted that an expected value model for valuing uncertain tax
positions may differ somewhat from the FIN 48 approach. Some commentators advo-
cated a valuation model similar to another international standard, LAS 37, "Provisions,
Contingent Liabilities, and Contingent Assets." Id. An application of the IAS 37
model of valuation would reflect the best estimate of amounts that could be required
to settle current tax and deferred tax assets and liabilities. This would differ some-
what from FIN 48, as FIN 48 states that tax positions should be recorded at their full
value if they meet the more-likely-than-not threshold.
140 Van Tassel et al., supra note 127.
141 IRS Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41, I.R.B. 428-29. For the 2010 tax year, the
disclosure requirement applies to corporations with more than $100 million in assets.
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need not be disclosed, the corporate taxpayer will need to provide a
"concise description" of the relevant facts of each uncertain tax posi-
tion.142 In addition, the IRS reaffirmed, if not expanded, its policy of
restraint regarding tax accrual workpapers, stating that, during the
examination phase, it would not argue that a disclosure to a corpora-
tion's independent auditors constitutes a privilege waiver. 143
Announcement 2010-75 covers both GAAP- and IFRS-reporting enti-
ties, meaning that certain IFRS-reporting entities could feel the conse-
quences of the intersection between LAS 12, Textron, and
Announcement 2010-75 as early as the 2010 tax year. 144 Therefore,
IFRS-reporting entities, under LAS 12, could ultimately experience
Textron's influence through two interrelated tax requirements: the
substantiation of probability estimates and the preparation (and
potential availability) of the related tax work papers.
First, the major dilemma confronting IFRS-reporting entities is
how to substantiate the probability estimates assigned to UTPs. Under
GAAP and FIN 48, taxpaying entities estimate whether a UTP is
"more-likely-than-not" based on related, previously litigated tax cases
and their own experience with IRS auditors. 145 Under the "more-
likely-than-not" standard, FIN 48 entities have an established proce-
dure in place to estimate the probability of tax positions that are 50%
or less likely to be upheld in the event of litigation. However, if the
SEC adopts a probability-weighted-average standard, FIN 48 entities
will not have procedures for estimating UTPs that are "more-likely-
than-not" to be upheld-those that fall between 50.01% and 100% in
the probable estimate scale. Because of the lack of expertise in esti-
mating those positions, entities would be at most speculating as to what
percentage should be applied to tax positions in the 50.01% to 100%
range. These speculated probability percentages will not have much
meaning or substance behind them, and any inquiry into the reasona-
bleness of the estimates will likely bear little fruit. For that reason, tax
That asset threshold will decrease to $50 million in the 2012 tax year and $10 million
by the 2014 tax year. Id. at 428.
142 Id. at 429. Initially, the IRS proposed that corporations would be required to
detail the rationale and nature of uncertainty for each uncertain tax position, but that
requirement was eliminated in the final rule. See IRS Announcement 2010-9, 2010-7,
I.R.B. 408.
143 IRS Announcement 2010-76, 2010-41, I.R.B. 432-33. However, the IRS
remained silent as to whether that policy of restraint would also apply in any resulting
litigation.
144 IRS Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41, I.R.B. 428.
145 See supra Part I.A.
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departments may be forced to seek out supporting opinions from
outside tax counsel as a means of verifying their own estimates.
Further, the difficulty in assessing the probability for "all possible
outcomes" also weighs against the reliability of the probability esti-
mates. As many argued in their comment letters to the IASB's pro-
posed tax standard, the Internal Revenue Code contains considerable
"gray" areas, which makes the analysis of tax uncertainties inherently
difficult, regardless of the applicable tax standard. However, where
FIN 48 limits the inquiry to tax positions with a less than or equal to a
50% chance of success, a probability-weighted-average tax standard
requires the assessment of every UTP. In order to comply with that
standard, then, entities must devote significant monetary resources to
correctly assess the UTPs that are more-likely-than-not to succeed
upon challenge anyway. Such an effort consumes corporate time and
assets, and weighs against the acceptance of the proposed standard in
its current form. 146 Moreover, after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002,147 management is required to certify that the financial state-
ments, including the estimates that drive the numbers produced
within those financial statements, are presented fairly. Under a
probability-weighted-average standard, then, management must also
certify that the probabilities articulated in its calculation of tax liability
are fair. Management will most likely have a difficult time certifying,
under the penalty of perjury, financial statements that contain mate-
rial tax position estimates with very little substance behind them.
Second, and relatedly, corporate tax departments will have to
increase their workpaper documentation under a probability-
weighted average standard in order to withstand scrutiny from inde-
pendent auditors. As discussed earlier, the concern in Textron hinged
on IRS access to documentation behind tax positions that are believed
to meet the "more-likely-than-not" standard, which would give the IRS
146 In its comment letter to IASB datedJuly 24, 2009, Mayer Brown LLP, a United
States law firm, made a similar argument to IASB regarding estimating low-probability
tax positions under the proposed IFRS standard:
[I]n practice it may be extremely difficult to even identify all possible out-
comes. Moreover, many such outcomes will, at most, be remote contingen-
cies not likely to have a material effect on an entity's overall assessment of its
tax position. However, under the proposed standard, it appears that it will
be necessary to assess the consequences of each of these outcomes.
MAYER BROWN LLP, COMMENTS ON ExPosuRE DRAFr 2009/2 (INCOME TAX) (July 24,
2009), [hereinafter MAYER BROWN COMMENTS], available at http://www.iasb.org/Cur-
rent+Projects/lASB+Projects/Income+Taxes/Exposure+Draft+and+Comment+Let-
ters/Comment+Letters/Comment+Letters.htm.
147 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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a "roadmap" in potential litigation. The proposed IFRS standard
exacerbates this concern. Under a probability-weighted-average stan-
dard, the IRS would enjoy potential access to analysis of each and every
tax position an entity takes. With this newly acquired breadth of docu-
mentation, the IRS may undertake more aggressive strategies to dis-
pute estimates of tax positions. 148 At the very least, the IRS could
obtain additional information, providing the government with an
unfair advantage in future adversarial litigation. I 49
However, these corporate concerns do not necessarily outweigh
the benefits achieved from applying Textron to corporations using the
probability-weighted-average standard for UTPs. First, as Professor
Ventry argues, the IRS is at an extreme disadvantage when collecting
tax revenues; for example, IRS auditors had to dig through nine four-
drawer file cabinets and a consolidated tax return totaling 4,000 pages
in order to find the supporting tax accrual workpapers for only nine
transactions.' 50 Therefore, the IRS's ability to get a "roadmap" for
weak spots on an entity's tax return could actually level the playing
field between the IRS and corporate taxpayers. 151 Second, the IRS's
efficiency gains in audits and litigation will reduce the cost of their
monitoring efforts, allowing taxpayer dollars to be shifted to other
needs. In other words, because both the IRS and the corporate tax-
payer will have complete access to information regarding the corpora-
148 With respect to FIN 48, the IRS has announced a "policy of restraint," which it
adheres to by only pursuing certain "transactions," such as the SILO transaction in
Textron. Internal Revenue Service, FIN 48 and Tax Accrual Workpaper (TAW) Policy
Update, I.R.S. LMSB Mem. 04-0507-044 (May 10, 2007), available at http://www.irs.
gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=171447,00.html. However, the "policy of
restraint" is not a statutory mandate and may be altered at any time. Some argue that
the IRS's policy of restraint has become less restrained since 2007. Ron Buch, The
Touch and Feel of Work-Product, TAx NOTES TODAY, Aug. 31, 2009, at n.4.
149 Mayer Brown LLP made a similar point in its previously noted comment letter,
but instead focused on how such disclosure to the IRS would affect an entity's future
assessment of probability:
[The proposed standard] may increase the likelihood of seemingly remote
outcomes because tax authorities will be put on notice of an entity's lawyers'
assessment of litigation strategies, which could then change tax authorities'
strategy. Furthermore, if tax authorities become aware of the number of
different ways that a taxpayer believes a position may affect others, taxpayers
may find it more difficult to reach resolution because tax authorities may
feel compelled to examine many or all of the overlapping issues prior to
resolving any of them.
MAYER BROWN COMMENTS, supra note 146.
150 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
151 Ventry, supra note 55, at 881 (citing "funding and personnel deficiencies" that
plague the IRS's regulatory efforts).
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tion's UTPs, settlements in tax litigation will probably increase, as
there will be no cat-and-mouse game to be played. 15 2
The legal consequences of moving to an international standard
are broad, and the Textron decision exacerbates the potential difficul-
ties. While the complexity in estimating the probability of uncertain
tax positions below the more-likely-than-not standard (i.e., under
50%) may befuddle corporate tax departments in the short term, the
Textron line of thinking will allow the IRS full access to those complex
estimates, and the opportunity, if it wishes, to challenge those esti-
mates on a regular basis. For this reason, the clash between the IFRS
and Textron may yield an unfavorable result for many corporate enti-
ties, and possible efficiency gains for the IRS and taxpayers.
CONCLUSION
The issue of protecting tax accrual workpapers is not a recent
debate, and the First Circuit's opinion in Textron is just the latest
installment in the series. The Textron majority dealt a significant blow
to work product advocates by narrowly applying the "because of' test
and concluding that the work-product doctrine does not prevent the
IRS from accessing tax accrual work-paper documentation. In the
short-term, the Textron opinion encouraged the IRS to promulgate
Announcement 2010-75 and 2010-76, but in the long term, the deci-
sion raises some serious concerns as the SEC considers the transition
to international accounting standards. In particular, if U.S. compa-
nies are required to move to an international probability-weighted
standard for reporting uncertain tax positions, the Textron decision
will lead to additional challenges for tax-reporting entities, not the
least of which are the difficulty in accurately assessing estimates of suc-
cess between 50.01% and 100% and the broad disclosure to the IRS of
its uncertain tax positions. This potential framework could not only
undermine the reliability of financial reporting, but also the value of
the adversarial system. However, these concerns do not necessarily
outweigh the societal gains achieved from the Textron decision. Broad
disclosure of tax accrual workpapers may level the playing field
between the IRS and corporate taxpayers, allowing for more com-
plete, timely, and accurate tax assessments. Additionally, if all tax
accrual information is disclosed, the efficiency of both IRS audits and
any resulting litigation could be improved, reducing the societal cost
of tax administration.
152 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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As situations like that presented in Textron come to the forefront,
we must ask ourselves: are we comfortable with the potential effects of
the Textron standard in a world governed by international tax account-
ing standards? Additionally, who should resolve such questions-
Congress, the courts, or administrative agencies like the IRS and SEC?
The answers to these questions may provide the first clues as to how
Textron will influence the corporate tax world-both now and in the
years ahead.
